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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
prior to the alleged 
1. Can a conversion occur when the party claiming 
the conversion had no possessory interest at the time of the 
alleged conversion? 
2. Can a conversion occur when the alleged converter 
rightfully came into possession of the property in question and 
no demand was made to return the property| 
conversion? 
3. Can a conversion occur when the alleged converter 
rightfully came into possession of the property in question 
and, upon demand from a secured party, thi alleged converter 
turned the property over to the secured pdrty? 
4. Can a party raise a claim of unjust enrichment on 
appeal when such claim was not made in th^ Amended Complaint 
nor argued in the District Court? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Petty Motor Lease Co. ("Petty"), 
brought this action against Defendant-Respondent, Masonry 
Equipment Supply Co., et al. ("Masonry Equipment"), for the 
alleged conversion of a Swinger 300 Forklilft ("subject 
forklift"). Petty's Amended Complaint alleges that Masonry 
Equipment converted the subject forklift b{y purchasing it 
subject to Petty's U.C.C. security interest from CS&G Masonry 
("CS&G"), and by using and disposing of the subject forklift, 
despite Masonry Equipment's lack of knowledge of CS&G's payment 
default which occurred in February 1981* 
After the submission of briefs and oral argument, the 
district court granted Masonry Equipment's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denied Petty's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Petty's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise 
denied. Judgment was entered February 8, 1985. Notice of 
Appeal was filed March 5, 1985. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On February 21, 1978, Petty sold the subject 
forklift to CS&G pursuant to the "Lease" document included in 
the addendum as Exhibit "A". (R. 76) 
2. On March 31, 1978, Petty filed a UCC-1 Financing 
Statement with the State of Utah listing itself as a seller or 
purchase money lender of the subject forklift. A copy of the 
UCC-1 Form filed with the State of Utah is included in the 
addendum as Exhibit "B". (R. 76) 
3. On August 28, 1979, CS&G conveyed the subject 
forklift to Masonry Equipment with representations that the 
subject forklift had been paid for in full. As shown by the 
payment record included in the addendum as Exhibit "C", at the 
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time of this conveyance CS&G was not in default on its 
agreement with Petty. (R. 76) 
4. In February, 1981, CS&G defaulted on its 
agreement with Petty. Masonry Equipment Was not aware of this 
default until February of 1983, when Petty demanded return of 
the subject forklift. (R. 76-77) 
5. On February 10, 1983, Petty (sent Masonry 
Equipment a letter demanding that Masonry (Equipment convey to 
Petty the forklift which Petty had sold to CS&G. A copy of 
said letter is included in the addendum a^ Exhibit "D". 
Pursuant to this demand, Masonry Equipment reobtained 
possession of the subject forklift and tendered it to Petty on 
April 27, 1983. Petty accepted possession) of the subject 
forklift on May 11, 1984. (R. 76-77) 
6. The subject forklift did not change in value 
between February, 1983 and June, 1983. (Rl. 78) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. At no time did all of the prerequisites for a 
conversion action by Petty against Masonry Equipment exist. 
Accordingly, Masonry Equipment was entitled to retain the 
subject forklift until (1) Petty had a riglfit to possess the 
subject forklift, (2) Petty made demand up0n Masonry Equipment 
to return the subject forklift, and (3) Maionry Equipment 
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refused to deliver the subject forklift* No conversion 
occurred in this case since Petty did not obtain a right to 
possess the subject forklift until CS&G's default in 1981, 
eighteen months after Masonry Equipment rightfully obtained 
possession of the subject forklift and since Petty chose not to 
exercise this right until 1983 when it made demand for and 
received the forklift. 
II. Petty has no proper claim for unjust enrichment 
and since it failed to raise this claim in the District Court. 
III. Masonry Equipment was not unjustly enriched since 
any benefit it obtained from the subject forklift was obtained 
as a result of its rightful purchase of the subject forklift 
from CS&G. 
IV. Replevin damages may not properly be granted 
Petty since Masonry Equipment did not wrongfully take nor 
detain Petty's property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETTY HAS NO CLAIM FOR CONVERSION AGAINST MASONRY 
EQUIPMENT. 
A. Masonry Equipment took the Subject Forklift 
Subject to Petty's Security Interest. 
When Masonry Equipment purchased the subject forklift, 
it did so without knowledge of Petty's security interest in the 
forklift. By reason of Petty's UCC-1 filing, however, Masonry 
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Equipment took the subject forklift subject to Petty1s security 
interest. Masonry Equipment violated non^ of Petty1s rights by 
thus taking possession of the subject forklift, but did face 
the risk that a default on the part of CS&G would give Petty 
the right to demand delivery of the subject forklift. Clark 
Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 8 Kan. App. 2d 569, 662 P.2 1301 
(1983). 
B. No Conversion Occurs with Respect to Property 
"until the Plaintiff (1) Gair|s a Right to Possess 
the Property, (2) Makes Demand for Return of the 
Property and (3) Is Refused the Return of the 
Property. 
The essential elements of an action for conversion are 
set forth in Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwai 
569, 662 P.2d 1301 (1983). In Clark Jewel 
named Graber obtained possession of a diamond bridal set from a 
debtor subject to a creditor's security irjterest. In analyzing 
the respective rights of the parties, the 
prerequisites to a claim for conversion: 
te, 8 Kan. App. 2d 
ers a third party 
court stated the 
Because it appears that Graber rightfully 
came into possession of the bridal set, she 
was entitled to retain possession) of that 
property until such time as plaintiff had 
gained the right to repossess, had made 
demand upon her, and she had refused to 
deliver the bridal set to plainti Iff. Then 
and only then could Graber have committed 
the tort of conversion. See Pros 
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ser, Law of 
Torts, § 15, pp 89-90 (4th ed. 1971); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 237 (1965). 
Id, at 1304-1305? see also Hogan v. Maxey, 121 Ga. App. 490, 
174 S.E.2d 208, 210 (1970) (where possession of property was 
lawfully acquired, proof of a demand for its return by the 
entity entitled to it and refusal by the defendant is a 
condition precedent to recovery). Accordingly, in the instant 
action, no conversion could have occurred with respect to the 
subject forklift until Petty (1) had gained a right to possess 
the property, (2) had made demand for return of the property, 
and (3) was refused the return of the property. 
In Frisco Joes, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327, Utah 
(1977) this Court applied this principle. In that case this 
Court held that a cause of action for conversion did not exist 
because the plaintiffs, at the time of the alleged conversion, 
did not have a right to possess the property in question. 
Similarly, in this case, at the time Masonry Equipment bought 
the subject forklift from CS&G, Petty, as a secured creditor 
under the Uniform Commercial Code, had no possessory interest 
in the subject forklift. Petty8s right to take possession of 
the forklift accrued only after default in payment occurred in 
1981. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-503 (1981). Petty, however, 
chose not to exercise its possessory rights until 1983 when it 
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demanded return of the forklift. Masonry Equipment responded 
by returning the forklift. As a secured qreditor making demand 
on a party who took the forklift subject to Petty1s security 
interest, Petty received from Masonry Equipment exactly what it 
had a right to receive. No further recovery is justified. 
The rule that a demand is a pre-condition for an 
action in conversion is not new. In Tompklins v. Fonda Glove 
Lining Co., 188 N.Y. 261, 80 N.E. 933, reh'g denied, 188 N.Y. 
635, 81 N.E. 1177 (1907), a vendor brought a conversion action 
against a transferee of property conditionally sold. In that 
case the court held that where the vendors^ after the default 
of their vendee in the payment of the purchase money allowed 
the vendee to continue in possession of the property, they 
could not charge the vendee with conversion until after 
demand. The Tompkins court stated: 
The universal rule in this state £s that, 
where property comes lawfully intcf) the 
possession of a party, he cannot lt>e charged 
for a conversion in failing to surrender it 
to the owner unless a demand therefore is 
made • • • • 
80 N.E. at 934; see generally Annot., 59 A.L.R. 134-148 (1929); 
see also Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28, 34 (1874) ("The rule is 
a reasonable and just one, that an innocenti purchaser of 
personal property from a wrong-doer shall first be informed of 
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the defect in his title, and have an opportunity to deliver the 
property to the true owner, before he shall be made liable as a 
tort feasor for a wrongful conversion"). 
The court in Production Credit Association v. 
Nowatzski, 90 Wise, 2d 344, 280 N.W.2d 118, 123 (1979) held 
that a conversion of secured farm equipment occurred when the 
possessor of the secured property refused to surrender the 
property at the demand of the secured party. 
Where . . . there is no wrongful taking and 
the defendant rightfully comes into 
possession of the chattels, a demand by the 
rightful owner and a refusal by the alleged 
tort feasor are necessary elements of the 
tort. 
Id. quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts 89 (4th ed.1971); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 237 (1965). 
Consistent with the general rule recently reiterated 
in Clark Jewelers and Nowatzski, no cause of action for the 
tort of conversion exists in the instant action. Once Petty 
informed Masonry Equipment of CS&G's default and demanded 
return of the subject forklift, Masonry Equipment repurchased 
the subject forklift from Red Ball and tendered the subject 
forklift to Petty. Given the fact that the subject forklift 
was in Red Ball's possession at the time of Petty1s demand for 
return, Masonry Equipment's recovery and delivery of the 
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subject forklift was accomplished within a| reasonable time. As 
Professor Prosser noted: 
Not every failure to deliver upon demand, 
however, will constitute a conversion. The 
defendant does not become a convej 
the goods are no longer in his po| 
control, so that he is unable to 
rter when 
ssession or 
(comply with 
the demand. . . and even when he has 
possession, a qualified refusal, for a 
reasonable purpose and for a reasonable 
length of time, is not a conversi on. 
Prosser, supra at 90. 
The three prerequisites to an act 
thus did not occur in this case. Eighteen 
ion for conversion 
months after Masonry 
Equipment rightfully came into possession of the forklift in 
1979, Petty obtained a possessory right to the forklift when 
CS&G defaulted on its obligations. Petty those not to assert 
that possessory right, however, until 1983 
Equipment of the default and demanded return of the subject 
forklift. But the third prerequisite, the 
when it told Masonry 
refusal of Masonry 
Equipment to return the forklift, never occurred. To the 
matter failed, 
the forklift and 
contrary, after negotiations to settle the 
Masonry Equipment reobtained possession of 
tendered it to Petty. Only if the delay fitom February to April 
in tendering the forklift is regarded as a refusal did a 
conversion take place. The finding of such a conversion, 
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would result in only nominal damages, however, since the 
evidence in the record is uncontroverted that the forklift did 
not change in value between February and April. (R.78) 
In the case at bar, the Record on Appeal and the 
foregoing discussion of case law clearly establishes that an 
action for conversion does not exist against Masonry Equipment 
in connection with the subject forklift. Accordingly, Masonry 
Equipment requests that the Order granting its Motion for 
Summary Judgment be affirmed. 
C. Appellant's Arguments are Without Merit and are 
Unsupported by Case Law. 
1. CS&G8s Sale of the Subject Forklift to 
Masonry Equipment Did Not Constitute a 
Default. 
Pursuant to the lease agreement whereby CS&G purchased 
the subject forklift from Petty, CS&G ,8agree[d] to continually 
maintain said property in good condition and repair." (Exhibit 
"A", 1f 3) In an unsuccessful attempt to establish a right to 
possession of the subject forklift prior to CS&G's actual 
default, Petty suggests that CS&G's conveyance of the subject 
forklift to Masonry Equipment constituted a breach of the lease 
agreement. Such an argument is clearly without merit. The 
Record contains no evidence that the conveyance of CS&G 
constituted a breach of the lease agreement. Masonry 
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Equipment, a recognized dealer of forklifts, not only 
specifically deals in new and used forklifts, but also provides 
forklift maintenance and repair service a^ an integral part of 
its business. The conveyance of the forklift to Masonry 
Equipment cannot properly be viewed as a breach of the lease 
agreement. 
Petty also argues that the conveyance of the subject 
forklift to Masonry Equipment constitutes a breach of paragraph 
7 of the lease agreement which states that 
or termination of this agreement User shall surrender the unit 
11
 [u]pon expiration 
repair . . . . 
evidence that Petty 
to Owner in good mechanical condition and 
(Exhibit "A", 1F 7) The Record contains nol 
has alleged or elected an expiration or termination of its 
agreement with CS&G. Since no expiration or termination has 
occurred, Petty cannot successfully argue piat paragraph 7 has 
been breached. 
Petty relies upon the decisions o^  
Marine Insurance Co. v. First National Bank, 26 Ariz. App. 157, 
546 P. 2d 1166, 1168 (1976), and America National Bank and Trust 
Co. v, Robertson, 384 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (A^ La. Civ. App. 1980) 
in support of its argument that CS&G's conveyance of the 
subject forklift to Masonry Equipment constituted a default. 
Such reliance is misplaced. In both cases^ the debtors were in 
X Empire Fire and 
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default in making payments prior to the collateral being 
conveyed. Both creditors thus had immediate possessory 
interests in the property* 
What Petty is seeking, after the fact, is a way of 
making CS&G's transfer of CS&G's rights in the collateral an 
implicit default of the lease agreement. The Uniform 
Commercial Code, however, does not allow such of result. Utah 
Code Ann., § 70A-9-311 (1953) providess 
The debtor's rights in collateral may be 
voluntarily or involuntarily transferred (by 
waiy of sale, creation of a security 
interest, attachment, levy, garnishment or 
other judicial process) notwithstanding a 
provision in the security agreement 
prohibiting any transfer or making the 
transfer constitute a default. 
CS&G's sale of the subject forklift to Masonry Equipment cannot 
constitute a default of the lease agreement, nor a conversion 
of the property. Petty cannot escape the fact that a default 
did not occur until 1981 and that Masonry Equipment therefore 
rightfully took possession of the property in 1979. 
2. Masonry Equipment's Use of the Subject 
Forklift and Sale to Red Ball Did Not 
Constitute a Conversion. 
The cases are clear that the mere existence of a 
perfected security interest does not create a conversion every 
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time the subject collateral changes hands* Subsequent 
purchasers merely take the property subject to Petty1s first 
priority interest. In Pearson v. Picco, 1|81 Wash. 613, 44 P. 2d 
186, 188-89 (1935), the court recognized that the conditional 
sales vendee in that case had "an interest which he could 
assign, sell, mortgage, or give away subjelct to the rights of 
the conditional sales vendor or the latter1s assignee." 
Nonetheless, Petty argues that Masonry Equipment's 
resale of the subject forklift to Red Ball constituted a 
conversion. The requirements of a demand Ifor return of the 
collateral and a refusal to do so protect the person who 
rightfully comes into possession of the collateral against the 
injustices that would result were Petty1s argument accepted. 
In addition, Petty argues that Makonry Equipment 
interfered with Petty1s rights by using th^ subject forklift. 
As set forth in the Record, Masonry Equipment was unaware of 
CS&G's default until February of 1983, at \|*hich time Petty made 
demand for the return of the forklift. (Rl 76-77) Masonry 
Equipment was at all times legally entitled to possess and 
authorized to use the subject forklift as it saw fit. As 
discussed above, absent a demand and subsequent refusal to 
I 
return the equipment, Masonry Equipment's possession cannot be 
deemed unlawful. Further, Masonry Equipment's conveyance of 
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the subject forklift to Red Ball occurred in May of 1981. Red 
Ball, another good faith purchaser, was also legally entitled 
to the possession of the subject forklift subject to Petty1s 
security interest, which was not exercised until Petty made 
demand for the return of the subject forklift. Upon Petty1s 
demand and in accordance with Petty1s security interest, 
Masonry Equipment recovered the subject forklift from Red Ball 
and tendered delivery to Petty. 
Petty cites two cases which suggest that a debtor's 
conveyance of secured property, without the prior consent of 
the creditor, constitutes a conversion by way of the debtor's 
unauthorized use of the property. See Colorado Bank and Trust 
Co. v. Western Slope Investments, Inc., 36 Colo. App. 149, 539 
P.2d 501 (1975); and United States v. Hughes, 340 F. Supp* 539 
(N.D. Miss. 1972). The instant action is clearly 
distinguishable from those decisions. In both those cases, the 
agreements contained provisions requiring written consent prior 
to the debtors' conveyance or disposal of the collateral. No 
such provision exists in Petty's lease agreement with CS&G. 
Only after a demand by Petty and an absolute refusal by Masonry 
Equipment or Red Ball to return the subject forklift would the 
use of the property become unauthorized. The facts of this 
case dictate that no such unauthorized use occurred and 
therefore no conversion resulted. 
-14-
II. PETTY HAS NO CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
A. Petty1s Claim for Unjust Enrichment Should not be 
Considered by this Court since Petty Failed to 
Raise this Claim in the District Court. 
In its brief. Petty for the first time in this action 
claims entitlement to "restitution" as a result of "unjust 
enrichment." The law is well established that an appellant 
cannot, on appeal, raise new theories and 
General Appliance Corporation v. Haw, Inc. 
claims for relief. 
, 30 Utah 2d 238, 516 
P.2d 346 (1973) (theory of recovery not submitted to the trial 
court could not be considered on appeal); Nelson v. Newman, 583 
P.2d 601 (Utah 1978) (where plaintiff did not pray for 
recission in trial court the issue of recission could not be 
raised on appeal); First Equity Corp. v. Utah State University, 
554 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975) (an appellant cannot ordinarily raise 
for the first time a theory on appeal different from that 
presented to the court below). Accordingly, this Court should 
not consider the unjust enrichment/restitution claim raised by 
Petty in its brief. 
B. Masonry Equipment has not be^n Unjustly Enriched 
since it Paid in Full for th£ Subject Forklift. 
The record does not support Petty*s assertion that 
Masonry Equipment was unjustly enriched in any manner 
whatsoever. The evidence is uncontroverteqi that Masonry 
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Equipment paid $35,000 for the subject forklift to CS&G at a 
time when Petty had no possessory interest in the subject 
forklift* (Deposition of Del Lewis at 26). Masonry 
Equipment's subsequent rental of the forklift and its 
subsequent resale in no way enriched Masonry Equipment 
unjustly. As discussed above, Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-9-311 
(1953) gave CS&G the right to sell its interest in the 
forklift* Masonry Equipment was not unjustly enriched. Any 
damage suffered by Petty was a result of Petty*s failure to 
protect its rights once CS&G defaulted in 1981, not Masonry 
Equipment's rightful conduct in relation to the forklift from 
1979 to 1981. 
III. PETTY IS NOT ENTITLED TO REPLEVIN DAMAGES 
In its brief, Petty asserts that it is entitled to 
damages for replevin. An action for replevin does not lie and 
unless there is either a wrongful taking or a wrongful 
detention damages for replevin cannot be awarded. Pugh v. 
Stratton, 22 Utah 2d 190, 450 P.2d 463 (1969). As discussed in 
Argument I above, the facts are uncontroverted that there was 
neither a wrongful taking nor a wrongful detention in this 
case. At the time Masonry Equipment obtained possession of the 
subject forklift in 1979 Petty had no possessory interest in 
the forklift. There was therefore no wrongful taking. By the 
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time Petty asserted a possessory interest in 1983, Masonry 
receives an absolute 
demand the holder of 
Equipment no longer had possession of the i forklift. There was 
therefore no wrongful detention. Thus, nq replevin damages can 
be awarded to Petty. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of applicable case law dictates that no 
action for conversion can exist against Masonry Equipment, a 
third-party, good faith purchaser of secured property, unless 
Petty 1) has a right to possess the subject forklift by reason 
of default by CS&G; 2) makes demand upon tjhe Masonry Equipment 
for return of the secured forklift; and 3) 
refusal from Masonry Equipment. Upon such 
a perfected security interest is entitled to repossession of 
the secured property from a third-party purchaser. In the 
instant action, Petty1s demand for the return of the subject 
forklift was satisfied by Masonry Equipment's recovery and 
delivery of the forklift to Petty. 
Similarly, no relief should be grinted on Petty1s 
claim of unjust enrichment since this claiijn was not raised in 
the district court and the facts do not support such a claim. 
Likewise, since there was no wrongful taking or wrongful 
detention of the subject forklift, Petty1s 
damages is without merit. 
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claim for replevin 
The pleadings, admissions and deposition of Del Lewis 
demonstrate no evidence of a conversion of the subject forklift 
by Masonry Equipment. The absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the acquisition, use and disposition of 
the subject forklift by Masonry Equipment dictates that the 
district court's Order, granting Masonry Equipment's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, should be affirmed on appeal* 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ day of August, 1985. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By ~^l &»%$. 
L. R.Curtis, Jr. 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 5^^ day of August, 1985, 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, by first class mail, 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS to: 
Ralph C. Petty 
Attorney for Appellant 
721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
/ X Lpk ^ 
1123C 
LRC 
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ADDENDUM 
Petty Motor Lease, Inc. 
"fitmt 
EXHIBIT "A" 
601 SOUTH MAIN 
SA£T LABS CITY, UTAH / 84111 
PHONE 363-2643 
11-1
 i \ inr££ttt£ttt m*d* *od eater*1 ,at0 ^Slsi-*** « February i>78 .
 by ^ betwatn PETTO 
OTOR LXA8S. INC., a corporation. hertlnafUr called Owner, and C S & G M a S O n r y „ _ _ of 
5487 Arches Dr. , Kearns, Utah 84118 
ereia eaUtd Ustr, WX7MS88XTH: 
Tfcat Owner hereby l e a s e e to User and U»er hires from Owner, for use "only within the Continental U n i t s of the United Sfeetes, the following do* 
eribed property, to*wit: 
1978 Swinger Forkliftmodel 300, Ser. No. 300637 
for s term of * ^ months eommeneiac on the £ l S t day of F e b . 19 7 8 , and ending on the 2 0 t h day of " F e b . 
19 O o which l e a s e shall be strictly under the following terms and conditions: 
1. User sgrees to pay to Owner as rental for the use of said property the ram of * 7 3 5 - B R « p l u s 5 % u s e t a x p*r month, payable in 
advance «t the office of Owner in Salt Lake City. Utah. If any rental payment i s not paid within 10 oays after m e due date thereof, this l eaae sheU 
automatically expire. Said monthly payment will permit User a maximum mileage of 20,000 miles per year. 
Additional rail*ege will be charged for at the rate of *° per mile. 
. . I ° . F * * r • « * • • • t o deposit with Owner the sum of S „ ^ i . " ^ Y r.Ofl be held by Owner, without Interest, until mil-terms of this l e a s e have been 
faithfully performed and the property returned to Owner In a satisfactory condition, whereupon said deposit shaU be returned to User. However, if 
User v io lates any condition ot this agreement Owner may retain such portion of said deposit as may be necessary to compensate Owner for the l o s s 
or damage caused by such violation, and should the sum deposit* d be insufficient t© compensate Owner for the l o e s or damage caused by such vio-
lation. User agrees to pay tho deficiency to Owner. 
3. User egress to continually maintain said property in good condition and repair and that whenever poss ib l e the maintenance of said property 
shall be performed at Owner's designated shop, st User's expense, sxcspt that if User operates a repair shop, work may be performed at such shop, 
but repair or replacement parts required for such maintenance shall be purchased from Owner's designated agency at prices prevailing at that time 
for such parts. 
4. In addition to the oayments hereinabove provided. User sgrees to pay Owner an amount equal to the sum of all registration f ees . l i c ense f e e s , 
property toxes or other fees and taxes , snd any other charges levied egs inst s a i d property or i ts use during the term of this l e a s e , it being under* 
stood that such sum s s Is paid by User to Owner under this paragraph shall be paid by Owner «e such charges are levied or a s s e s s e d , snd should 
edditionel amounts be levied or a s s e s s e d sgs ins t said property or i t s use . User sgrees to pay the same to Owner upon demand. User also agrees to 
pay or discharge the cost of traffic citations or parking t ickets a s s e s s e d against User or the property dunng the term of this l e a s e . 
Sc ( U S e r ^ agrees to maintain during the term of this leas® not l e s s thanl2Sr000prQfisrty damage insurance and $100.000/3300,000 pub-
l i c l iabil ity lnaurance, which iaaurance shall provide protection for Owner snd User. The (^JUJS&JZ^) agrees to maintain during the term of tbie 
l eaae . fire, theft, comprehensive snd $100 deduct ible col l i s ion insurance on th*> above described property, which insurance shall provide protection 
for Owner sad User s s their Interests may appear. In caae of damage User sgrees to pay the first $100 of the cost of replacement or repairs and eU 
damage mot covered by such insurance Owner may have in effect st the commencement of this Lease fire, theft, comprehenaive and $100 deductible 
col l is ion insurance. If User furnishes Owner with evidence of setisfactory lnaurance coverag e within fifteen daya from tho commencement of tfec 
leaae. Owner's lnaurance policy shall be terminated with no expense to User. However, if evidence of satisfactory insurance coverage has not bee© 
famished by User within fifteen days of the commencement of this l ease . User shall pay to Owner the total premium under such lnaurance pol icy of 
Owner and that pol icy may be kept In full force mnd effect during the term of this i e e s e . In addit ion. User specif ical ly agrees to defend and hold 
barmieec Owner from any claim or liability whatsoever arising from the use of the property herein l eased during the term oTtftle l e a s e , including 
Owner's Negl igence . Should User now or in the future become an "'assigned risk'* or should s higher than average insurance premium otherwise? b« 
required, and if Owner has herein sgreed to maintain insurance coverage, user agrees to pay any additional premium upon dessando 
Oo This L e a s e may be terminated by User at any time dunng the period of the Lease , or. it u ser n e i « t « « any e« «*e ce«ae ot this screesaeaL, 
Owner may, without not ice , terminate this L e a s e . If this Lease i s terminated by either Owner or User for sny reason or expires as provided in parsZ 
graph l, hereof. User agreea to pay to Owner any and all peat due payments or other sums then due under the terms of this Lease , Including, but not 
limited to, the cos t of repairs required to bring the property to good condition plus the final l e a s e payment in full, snd, in addition thereto, to pay 
45 por cent of the monthly rental multiplied by the number ot months the l e e s e has yet to nsn9 which sum la to compensate Owner (or the greater 
coats and depredat ion oceuring during the first part of the L e a s e s s eompsred to the l e s t part of the Leaae . 
To Upon expiration or termination of this agreement User shall surrender the unit to Owner in good mechanical condition and repair, with t ires 
having as least 50 per cent of original tread and free from body damage, scratched or chipped paint or torn or frayed upholstry . Any expense bv 
Owner to bring unit to the above described condition shall be paid for by Uaer. 
t . [f User fa i l s to make payments when due, or If User fai ls to perform sny other condition of this l e a s e . Owner may enter the premises upon 
which the property unit Is kept, without notice or demand, and remove the same with or without process of law and Uaer hereby waives any action for 
trespass or damage resulting from such entry or removal. User sgrees to pay ell cos t s and expenses including reasonable attorney's fees , Ineozrwd 
by Owner In enforcement of i ts rights under this agreement snd sgrees to pay interest at the highest rats allowed by law upon all amounts not paid 
wh i due. 
9. User s ecept s the property In Its present condition mad acknowledges that there srs ae warrantees express or implied s s to the condition, 
su: ibii lty> -^usiity or performance of the property. 
EXECUTED the day sud year first above written. 
PETTY M O T O f J ^ A S E , INC. 
By 
Its, 
In consideration of the execution of the sbove Lease by Motor Lease , Inc., we, the undersigned, jointly and severally guarantee payments ot sM 
amounts due or to become due under the sbove Lease and guarantee portorxnmneo of all the terms thereof and consent to any extension of time for 
payments ot performance. 
EXECUTED this day of , 1 9 6 _ 
This lease will pay out in full if 
payments are made as called for over 
60 months, and property will become 
•••w*w«t%y wa ie \ if <* iyf . 
qrifj t u « Name PiMtl and address<es) 
I & G Masonry 87-0303663 
7 Arches Dr. irns.^ Lttah 84118 
c. or f to. U3. Number 
2. Secured ParTy<iesl and addren(es) 
Petty Motor Lease Inc.* 
601 South Main St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
87 0222742 
'inanong statement covert the following types (or items) of property: 
1 Swinger Forklift, Model 200 
Ser. No, 200143 
1 Swinger Forklift, Model 300 
Ser. No. 300637 
& Gross Sales Price of 
Collateral 
S 20..9.0.0..00 
44/132. 30— 
s 1.045.00 
"Hr,Mrte 
Utah 
.Sales 
State of 
For Filing Officer (Oate, Time, Number, 
and Filing Office) 
* 4 S 8 7 8 
0AV?r • vnife^u 
5. Awgnee^gflS^oredrtrty^d-Addreastes) 
Walker -Bank- 3c-T rarstXT o. 
1030 E. 21st South - , £ 
Salt.Lake Cijy, Utah 8410) 
few 11 /Zi2fH'78 ••' 
This statement is filed without the debtor's signature to perfect a security interest in collateral. (check(x]if so) H f c C £ i V £ D 
• already subiect to a security interest in another jurisdiction when it was brought into this state, 
Q which is proceeds of the original collateral described above m which a security interest was perfected: 
:k g j »f covered: [ j Proceeds of Collateral are also covered. QProducts of Collateral are also covered. No. of additional Sheets presented: 
The secured party is Q i s not J a seller or purchase money tender of the collateral 
Filed with: 
%>XO A WALKER BANK & TRUST 
Office 
COMPANY 
xgnatu 
«y.PFTTY MOTOR LEASE INC. by 
Signatureis) of Secured Party 
STANDARD FORM • FORM UCC-1. 
APPROVEO BY CLYOE L. MILLER. SECRETARY OP STATE. FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Filing Officer Copy • Alphabetical 
• mi •• Jin i i 
& / • * * * ' (D 
BTOON j f , MOTOt N O _ 
/ ^ t w ^ <>fr*^^s
 f njciLf *Zn 
UKff OF PAYMBff * 7 >? -T- PS TAX . ? T 7 tf INSUIANCI 
mO»HVMINTS 6= 0 SA11SMAN •' '* 
kYMfNTOUI rfl^JT-^L^, /V7? - / O ^ J f i / / V ? g > 
L PAYMENT DUI 
wr V.drcg *3r?'ix —e^- ^ 7 V 
-"rj^r7T=7 
w- . , 
_ U C » « I N O . 
^ g < zjs.yf •• VV./s? f* 
EXHIBIT "D" 
Utah Code Annotated 
70A-9-311. Alienability of debtor's rights — Judicial process. The 
debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred 
(by way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, levy, garnish-
ment or other judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security 
agreement prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer constitute a 
default. 
EXHIBIT "E" 
Utah Code Annotated 
70A-9-503. Secured party's right to take possession after default. 
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take 
possession of the collateral In taking possession a secured party may pro-
ceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the 
peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the 
secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make 
it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured 
party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a 
secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collat-
eral on the debtor's premises under section 70A-9-504. If a secured party 
elects to proceed by process of law he may proceed by writ of replevin or 
otherwise. 
